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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
DON ADAMSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8161

UNITED MINE WORKERS 0'F
AMERI'CA,
Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Defendant and Respondent
The parties will be referred to as they appeared below,
the appellant herein being the plaintiff, and the respondent
the defendant.
The figures in parentheses ref,er to the page number
of the Record.
The word ''International" as hereinafter used refers to
the defendant, which is the United Mine Workers of America, International Union.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statements of the case and facts contained in the
plaintiff's brief omit many of the pertinent facts and do not
therefore fully and accurately fleflect the Record. We, there-
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fore, deem it advisable to make an adequate presentation
of the Record.
The plaintiff brought this action against the United
Mine Workers of Ainerica, International Union, (122). Its
offices are in Washington, D. C., and not Price, Utah, as
plaintiff states on Page 1 of his brief. The United Mine
Workers of America, District 22, consists of local unions
chartered by International and situated in the states of
Utah and Wyoming. The main district offioe is at Rock
Springs, Wyoming, but said District also maintains an office at Price, Utah (168). District 22 is autonomous and has
its own officers, to-wit: the President, Secretary and Treasurer, who reside at Rock Springs, Wyoming. The Vice President of said District resides in Carbon County, Utah. In
1952, the year involved herein, the office of District Vice
President was vacant. Harry Mangus and Frank Sacco were
serving by appointment of the District Executive Board on
alternate months as acting Vioe Presidents ( 4, 98). In addition to the District's officers mentioned above, there is an
Executive Board for District 22, elected within the district
(Exhibit "A", P. 7). Some of the members on this Board
reside in Wyoming and some in Utah. Harry Mangus was
such a board member for said District at the time of the
alleged occurrences herein (96, 110, 122).
The only person from the District directly connected
with the defendant (International Union) is an International
Executive Board Member (Exh. "A," p. 12). In other words,
the District elects one of its members to serve on the International Executive Board every four years,; this person is
known as an International Executive Board Member, and is
an officer of International. This is the officer referred to in
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the Constitution under Article VII entitled Officers (Exh.
"A"). There is a distinction between a District Board Member who serves on the governing body of the District, and
this one International Executiv·e Board Member. Apparently, plaintiff has confused the two on Page 6 of his brief
under Subdivision (b). Mr. Mangus was not the International Executive Board Member, but only the District Board
Member. The record shows that at the tim·e of the alleged
occurrences, the office of International Executive Board
Member was vacant, having been vacated in 1951 by Malcolm Condie (127, 128). In 1953 his successor was elected,
but did not take office until April 1954 (128). We wish to
emphasize that the defendant herein is the United Mine
Workers of America, International Union, only. District 22
of the United Mine Workers of America and Wellington Local Union to whom the employees of the Coal Creek Coal
Company, and its successor the Eastern Utah Cbal Company
belonged, are not defendants herein.
It appears from the record that Harry Mangus, an officer of District 22, was confused as to whether this suit
was against the International Union or District 22 (113).
The reason for the confusion apparently is that both of said
unions are designated in part by the title of United Mine
Workers of Am·erica, and process herein was finally served
upon Frank Sacco, an officer of District 22 at Price, Utah.
(See Sheriff's Return, p. 4 of Record). w.e suggest that if
the plaintiff had added the word "International" after the
words "United Mine Workers of America" in the Complaint
and Summons, it is very likely this confusion would have
been avoided.

Plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, al-
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leging in substance, among other things, that on or about
April 6, 1952, the defendant established a picket line at a
junction of a road, about ten miles from, but leading to the
mine of the Eastern Utah Coal Company in Carbon County,
Utah; that said pickets blockaded the only road leading to
said mine; that some of said pickets forced plaintiff to accompany them from said mine where he was working to
said picket line, and that plaintiff was held captive against
his will for about two hours; that while he was so held captive, he was threatened, intimidated, and ordered to leave
the county and never to return if he valued his life. Plaintiff alleges that some of the pickets who came to the mine
were armed; plaintiff also alleges other indignities and
claims certain damage·s (7, 8).
We call the Court's attention to the fact that the evidence does not support plaintiff's contentions that the defendant established or maintained the picket line, nor does
it show that the defendant committed any of the acts detailed in the Complaint. There is also no allegation that any
purported agent of the defendant committed the above acts
in the scope or course of his employment. Furthermore, no
ratification is alleged.
Briefly, defendant's Answer, after admitting there was
a picket line on the date and at the place aforesaid, denies
that said pick,ets were its representatives, or that they were
authoriz,ed in any manner whatsoever to represent the defendant (10, 11).
Defendant further alleged in substance, among other
things, that on the date aforesaid, and for some time prior
thereto, there had been and was a labor dispute between the
operators and employees of the Coal Creek Coal Company;
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that at an election held among said employees, they had
voted to join the United Mine Workers of America; that
said Company was notified, but thereafter ref:used to sign
a contract, to meet and bargain collectively with ~said em.:.
ployees to arrange terms and conditions of employment,
and defaulted in a payroll ; that said employees for said
reasons on their own individual initiativ~e called a work stoppage at said mine; that while the same was in progress, the
E·astern Utah Coal Company took over the mining operations of the former, with knowledge of said labor dispute,
election, and work stoppage, but nevertheless brought certain non-union men to work and take over the jobs of an
equal numher of said employees; that said work stoppage
was continued against said Eastern Utah Coal Company for
said reason, upon the individual initiative and under the direction of said employees; that the defendant did not authorize, direct, or participate therein; that defendant did
not participate or authori'ze any of the alleged wrongful
acts allegedly committed against the plaintiff, did not ratify the same, and had no actual knowl·edge thereof; that
defendant did not authorize any individual to r·epresent it
on the picket line, and did not have any authorized agents
or servants in, near, or at said picket line; defendant did
not authorize the said work stoppag.e, and did not control
or dominate any of the persons involved therein ; that defendant was informed and believes that the local union officers cautioned the pickets that all picketing should be done
peaceably, and that no firearms would be permitted; that
defendant likewise cautioned to the same eff.ect, which is
customary when any members are on a picket line whether
defendant authorized or called the work stoppage, or otherwise (12, 13, 14). This is a standard instruction from In-
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ternational as well as the District (118, 119).
The evidence shows that the picket line was actually
on a public road, six to seven miles from the mining property (72, 73). We submit that the evidence supports the
allegations of defendant's answer.
The only question involved in this appeal is whether
or not the plaintiff established an agency relationship between the person or persons who allegedly committed the
false imprisonment and assault upon plaintiff, and the defendant herein.
This is an appeal from a ruling of the trial Court granting the defendant's Motion to Dismiss the action upon the
ground that the plaintiff failed to establish an agency relationship which would tend to connect the defendant with
the occurrences which the plaintiff alleges took place on or
about April 6, 1952 (171). It is defendant's position that
the evidence does not establish an agency relationship, and
that the Court's ruling should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The real question herein is, Who committed these
wrongful acts of which complaint is made, if they were in
fact committed? In view of the pleadings, it is incumbent
upon plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the picket line was established or maintained by defendant by and through its duly authorized agents acting
within the scope of their employment. See Mecham on
Agency, Book 1, 2nd Edit., Sec. 255; 3 C.J.S. 297, 298, Sec.
328 .Defendant contends that the evidence conclusively
shows that the picket line was established and maintained
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by the employees of the Coal Creek Coal Company and its
successor, the Eastern Utah Coal Company, and was the
voluntary and individual action of said employees ( 64, 65,
66, 67, 68) . The evidence further shows that the men on the
picket line were acting entirely on their own initiativ:e to
protect their jobs (67). No agency whatsoever is shown by
the evidence which connects the picketing in any manner
with the defendant. Not only does the evidence show that
the picketing was the voluntary and individual action of
the said employees and to protect their jobs, but in addition
thereto, Arnold Skinner, one of the plaintiff's witnesses,
testified that to his knowledge no financial assistance was
received from the defendant to finance the work stoppage
or strike (64), and f.urther that to his knowledge neither
the defendant nor District 22 had anything to do with the
establishment of said picket line (66); that he had never
seen at any time a District officer or !'lepresentative at the
picket line (67). Furthermore, when asked who directed
the movement of the m·en on the picket line and who had
charg.e of the m,en, he testified that the men thems·elves
would get together and talk it over, and he ·explained he
meant the men involved in the "shut-out" (67). We wish
to emphasize that this evidence was brought out by the
plaintiff on direct examination, and clearly negatives any
principal-agency relationship whatsoever between the defendant and those who aHegedly committed the wrongful
acts.
Even if the Court is satisfi,ed that these m·en on the
picket line were members of the defendant organization,
certainly that fact standing alone would not in and of
itself make the defendant liable for their action or con-
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duct (31 Am. Jur. 982, Sec. 300; Sweetman v. Barrows, 161
N.E. 272, 62 A.L.R. 311), unless the same were authorized
by the defendant, or unless they were agents of the defendant acting within the scope of their employment, or
unless the defendant with full knowledge thereof did ratify
and intend to ratify the same. We submit that the evidence
does not establish any of said elements. The question of
ratification will be discussed hereafter. There is no testimony that any member of the picket line was an agent of
the defendant and the record is lacking in testimony that
any of these men on the picket line was acting in the
course of any employment whatsoever. As above stated,
the evidence is that they were acting on their own initiative
to protect their jobs.
Not only is there a total lack of evidence that the alleged principal, to-wit: the defendant herein, in any manner
authoriz.ed or participated in the conduct complained of on
the part of the pickets, but the evidence does not show that
the defendant even knew of such alleged conduct at the
time it allegedly occurred.
On p. 2 of his brief, plaintiff states that a picket line
of 150-200 men was established on or about April 6, 1952,
across the road leading to said mine, citing R. 87. (Actually
the record shows at said page that there were 150 men,
maybe more, maybe less), but no attempt is made by plaintiff to show who, under the evidence, established said picket line, in spite of the fact that this is the decisive question
in this case. The references we have made above to the
record clearly show that the employees themselves established and maintained the picket line, and not the defendant
or any agent thereof.
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Furthermore, plaintiff points out on p. 3 of his brief,
that the men (on the picket line) came from various places
throughout the county. This fact is of little significance in
view of plaintiff's evidence that many men came to the
picket line out of curiosity. "You know how men are, they
get curious, come to see what is going on, come to visit,
stand around and talk a little bit, and take off (60) ."
Plaintiff, on p. 3 of his brief, alleges that prior to April
6, 1952, Harry Mangus and other officers went to the mine
attempting to organize it and threatened to prevent any
coal from going down the canyon. Also, plaintiff states the
men were representatives of the United Mine Workers of
America, as brought out on cross-examination.
The evidence establishes that Harry Mangus and Frank
Sacco were officers of District 22 only. Neither of these
men were agents of the defendant acting within the course
of any employment. Skinner, Rice, and Olson, who are the
other officers referred to by the plaintiff above, were officers of Wellington Local Union. Furthermore, Mangus
testified he talked to the men at the mine on April 4, 1952,
which is the occasion to which plaintiff has reference ,and
answered their questions, not in any particular capacity,
but on his own knowledge and on his own volition. (In other
words, he was acting on his own) (103, 104). Therefore,
where is the evidence connecting defendant with this visit
to the mine, or proving any agency whatsoever?
The evidence shows that no representative from defendant was present at any of the negotiations for a contract, nor during the picketing (106). The title ''United Mine
Workers of America" applies to every coal miner who be-
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longs to the local, district or International unions. However,
even if we assume that Mangus, Skinner, Rice, and Olson,
when they allegedly told Austin Beal they were representatives of the United Mine Workers of Am·erica meant to
convey the impression that they were representing the defendant (94), as distinguished from the local or district organization of said Mine Workers, still agency cannot be
shown by the mere declarations of the alleged agent. This
Court has said that this rule is elementary. Cronquist v.
Smith, 42 U. 575, 133 P. 130. See also Ephraim Willow
Creek Irr. Co. v. Olson, 258 P. 216, 222, 70 U. 95. We submit
there was no prima facie showing of agency by other evidence. Meyer v. Kirkwood, 38 P. 2d 866, subsequent of 48 P.
2d 30.
The contract (Exh. "B") was signed on April 7, 1952,
between the representatives of the district and local unions
and management (106). Certain provisions thereof apply
to the district and local organizations (Exh. ''B", p. 7),
which is undoubtedly one reason why representatives thereof affixed their signatures to the contract. Also, it is customary for both International and District officers to sign
a contract (127). No representative from International was
shown to have been present at any of the negotiations (106).
The same, therefore, must have been submitted to International at a later date for approval. No contract is binding
as far as International is concerned without its approval
(127). If Mangus was a duly authorized agent of International, why could he not have signed the contract on behalf of the defendant? The contract itself shows that Mangus and Sacco signed on behalf of District 22 only (E·xh.
"B". Also 125).
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In connection with the signing of the contract, plaintiff
states that the same was signed between the Coal Company
and International, all as a resu},t of the threats, violence,
and strike activities. The evidence, however, is that all
meetings leading up to the signing of the contract were harmonious and pleasant (101, 152). These negotiations for a
contract had been going on since about March 20, 1952, or
prior thereto (161), and there is no justification in the evidence for saying the contract was the result of threats, violence and strike activities. Also, since the operator was able
to make out a list of the men from Salina he wanted to retain and the local union submitted a list it ·chose to remain
at work (164, 166, 167), "and between the two lists we
worked out a crew" (167), the agreement appears at best to
have been a compromise arrived at after considerable discussion and negotiation.
Plaintiff, immediately after the above assertion, alleges on p. 3 of his brief, that the ne~t day following the
signing of the agreement, the pickets were taken off by Mr.
Mangus (citing p. 167). However, Mr. Reichert's testimony
on said page is to the effect that, "Mr. Mangus, delegated
I believe, Skinner and Rice (officers of Wellington Local
to whom the employees belonged) to round up the men so
that we could go to work in the morning." The witness also
testified that Mangus said that the picket line would be
broken up and that everyone would be able to go through,
and that the witness believed Mangus delegated a man to
see that it was cleared (167). (Note: Mangus did not say
he would break up the picket line.)
However, plaintiff's witness, Mangus, gives us an entirely different version. In answer to a question as to whe-
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ther he told Mr. Reichert that he (Mangus) would remove
the pickets, Mangus replied, "Yes, I believe I told Mr. Reichert if I had any jurisdiction of any pickets (emphasis
ours) , I would remove them, and furthermore I would like
to state that I told Mr. Reichert at that time that I was
sure that the trials and tribulations pertaining to his mine,
if any agreement was negotiated, that they wouldn't have
any picketing of any sort or nature whatsoever (107) ."
Also, Mr. Mangus testified as follows:
"Q. When were the pickets tarken off?

A. That I couldn't say. I believe there was pickets
on their own, and I felt if they knew an agreement was consummated between the United Mine Workers and Mr. Reichert, that those that were on the picket line would leave
on their own volition (107)"
From the last quoted portion of Mr. Mangus' testimony,
it is apparent that Mr. Mangus felt that the pickets would
leave on their own volition and would not have to be removed when they learned that a contract had been negotiated. There is no evidence he himself removed them.
Even Mr. Reichert's testimony was to the effect that Mangus "delegated" to members of the local the job of getting
the men back to work (167).
We search the record in vain for any evidence that
Mangus received any orders from International regarding
the contract or with reference to any matter leading up
thereto. As heretofore stated, Mangus testified he was not
answering questions in any particular capacity, but from
his own knowledge, and that he was actually visiting there
(at the mine on April 4, 1952) (103, 104). Mr. Skinner tes-
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tified that he, Rice and Olson asked Mr. Mangus to go up to
the mine on April 4, 1952, to explain the benefits of belonging to the union since he was better versed on such matters,
and to avoid misstatements and misconceptions (69).
Therefore, Mr. Mangus was acting in behalf of Skinner,
Rice and Olson on said occasion. He was not there as an
agent of International or even the District. Mr. Mangus
himself also testified he was not representing the International Union, which is the defendant herein (122). His testimony in this regard as plaintiff's witness is certainly competent.
Otto Reichert, one of the owners of the mine, also
stated he knew that Mangus was representing the United
Mine Workers of America in some capacity, but he didn't
know which (emphasis ours). He also testified that
he knew Mangus was in the District office (145, 146).
Ronald Reichert's testimony contains the statement
that he didn't "know of any International or wh.at would be
District and International (168) ."
We have gone somewhat into detail quoting the testimony of Harry Mangus for the reason that plaintiff's cas·e
appears to be built upon the erroneous assumption that
Harry Mangus was representing the International Union in
all that he said or did with respect to the negotiations for
and the execution of the contract, as well as other matters,
whereas the evidence clearly shows that fr~m time to time
Mangus was representing either the District, the officers
of Wellington Local, i.e., Skinner, Rice and Olson, or was
acting on his own initiative. When he signed Exh. "B", the
contract, he signed it in his capacity as acting Vice Presi-
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dent of District 22 only. We have his unequivocal statement
that he was not representing International, which we have
cited above.
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
Point I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THEACTION UPON THE GROUNDS OF
LACK OF AGENCY
Point II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW
ANY RATIFICATION
ARGUMENT
Point I
The Court did not ·err in dismissing the action upon
the grounds of lack of agency.
Our position is that under the evidence, no agency was
shown. Also, the evidence was not conflicting on the question of agency.
Plaintiff cites Goddard v. Lexington Motor Company,
223 P. 340; 63 U. 161, and the authorities cited in 3 C.J.S.
Section 330. The material facts in the Goddard case are:
Matthews was intermountain representative of Lexington Motor Company, a manufacturer and seller of cars.
Appellant contracted with a dealer for purchase of a car.
Before shipment, said dealer retired from the transaction.
The car, with others, was shipped by Lexington Motor Com-
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pany to Ogden consigned to itself. A draft was drawn on
Matthews for all cars shipped, including the one involved in
this case. When shipment was made, Lexington Motor
Company wired Matthews : "Shipment made Ogden yesterday. Not knowing conditions there draft drawn on you
through bank specified Ogden by dealer. Trust you will
handle satisfactorily."
The car could not be inspected until the draft was paid.
Matthews told appellant if he advanced the purchase price,
the Bill of Lading would be released, and he could examine
the car and if it was not satisfactory, he could return it and
his money would be refunded. Appellant agreed and upon
inspection found the car defective and demanded the return
of the purchase price.
The main question in this case was whether the evidence of authority of Matthews to bind respondent by his
agreement with appellant was sufficient to be submitted to
the jury. The trial court granted a non-suit.
This court points out: that Matthews knew the details
of the situation with appellant; the wire from the company
stated "Trust you will handle satisfactorily;" Matthews
stated he had no personal interest in the matter, except as a
representative of the company ... he said he was representing the factory; that Goddard was dealing directly
with the company. The shipment was consigned to Lexington Motor Company. Matthews endorsed the Bill of Lading
by signing the company's name by M. Matthews, Mgr. All
cars contained in shipment were not delivered to purchasers,
and those undelivered were in charge of Matthews.
This court held the evidence was sufficient to show
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prima facie, that Matthews was entrusted with the car with
authority to sell it, and that in so doing under, the circumstances, had apparent authority to make the agreement that
if the car, after inspection, was not satisfactory, it could be
returned, and the purchase price refunded.
The distinguishable feature between the Goddard case
and the case at bar is that in the former, the principal had
wired authority to Matthews to handle the matter. In the
Adamson case, no communication or orders whatsoever were
received from the alleged principal, to-wit: International,
and the evidence fails to connect International with any of
the alleged wrongful acts or any other transactions.
In 3 C.J .S., Section 330, p. 323, referred to by plaintiff,
the general rul~e is therein cited as follows: "Agency is a
question of fact to be determined by the jury or other trier
of facts unless no competent evidenc·e legally sufficient to
prov~e it has been introduced or the material facts from
which it is to be inferred are undisputed and only one
conclusion can be reasonably drawn therefrom." However,
this same authority at p. 325 states, "On the other hand,
agency is a question of law for the Court where the material
facts from which it is to be inferred are not in dispute, and
only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom.
Whether or not there is any competent evidence reasonably
tending to prove the existence of an agency is for the court
to determine; and, if there is none, or if it is so slight that
a finding thereon of the existence of the agency would not
be sustained, the question may and should be disposed of
by the court alone and not be submitted to the jury" (Emphasis ours). Apparently, counsel has entirely overlooked
the portion of the rule we have emphasized above, which we
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believe applies to this case. See also Cerchio v. Mullins,
138 A. 277 (Del.); Lake Grocery Company v. Chiostri, 158
N.W. 998 (N. D.); Godfrey v. Ziemak, 18 Pa. Dist. & Co.
195. See also the numerous cases cited in 3 C.J-S., Section
330, p. 326, footnote 54.
We point out that in 3 C.J.S. 326, the author states
that the question of whether a certain written instrument,
which is clear and unambiguous is sufficient to ·create the
relation of principal and agent is one of law for the court.
Under this authority, it was proper for the ·court to construe Exhs. ''A" and "B" in the Adamson case and to
determine whether the same were sufficient to create the
relation of principal and agent.
Counsel also cites California Jewelry Company v. McDonald, 30 P. 2d 778 (Ida.). In this Idaho case the Court
said: "It appears that considerable ·correspondence between
Kelley and appellant was introduced in ·evidence, which correspondence is susceptible of different conclusion being
drawn therefrom as to whether Kelley was an agent of appellant, or an independent dealer. In addition thereto,
there is evidence that Kelley held himself out as such
agent; the deposition of Mr. Levison connected with appellant, contains the statements: That they had done business with Mr. Kelley before, for several years, sending him
jewelry purchased as well as for sale~ that in this instance
'we sent it to him naturally for sale;' that the ring was
sent 'on approval;' and that 'we owned the ring at the time
of the sale.' "
The Court said: ''It cannot be logically contended that
there is no substantial conflict in the evidence as to the
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existence of an agency between Kelley and appellant." ... p.
780.
In the Adamson case, the evidence does not show a long
course of dealing, and we do not have any evidence on the
part of the alleged principal which is susceptible of being
interpreted to mean that there was an agency relationship
between the defendant herein and Harry Mangus, or the
pickets. Therefore, the Idaho case does not assist plaintiff.
Plaintiff states on p. 5 of his brief that there is
"strong" evidence in the record that the Local and District
organizations are under the control of the defendant (emphasis ours). Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution of the International (Exh. "A") is cited to the effect that all Districts,
Sub-districts and Local Unions must be chartered by and be
under the jurisdiction of and subject to the laws of International and rulings of the International Executive Board
... Section 3 provides that if an individual is ruled against
by the local, he may appeal to International.
It is true that District and Local Unions are chartered
by International. The various States charter corporations,
but this does not necessarily make the corporations agents
of the State. Furthermore, the mere fact that Districts and
Locals may be under the jurisdiction of International's laws
and rulings does not necessarily mean they are general
agents of International. It is true that International has
the final say on certain matters of policy and in the event
the District or Locals take action repugnant to the Constitution of International, the latter must prevail. Even though
it be conceded that the local unions and the districts are
under the jurisdiction of the International generally, there
is still no evidence whatsoever that International in any way
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directed the local union or the district to establish or carry
on the picket line. All plaintiff's evidence is to the contrary as aforesaid. Therefore, these constitutional provisions cited do not assist plaintiff in attempting to ·establish
an agency relationship between the defendant and the persons who committed the said wrongful acts, in the absence
of any evidence showing that the defendant directed or
authorized the local union or District 22 to do said acts
or to participate therein.
Plaintiff further cites on p. 5 of his brief, Article XVI,
Sec. 1 of the Constitution (E-xh. "A"), which gives authority to the District to call strikes provided the same are authorized by International. These provisions do not have
any material significance in this case for the reason that
there is no evidence tending to show that the District
called any strike herein, nor that the District had anything
whatsoever to do therewith. Plaintiff's witness, Arnold
Skinner, testified that he became quite indignant because
he never saw at any time any District officer or representative at the picket line, and that he asked them "if they
was interested in what we was doing and they would never
give me any help (67) ."
In subdivision (b) of plaintiff's brief, p. 6, the plaintiff
points out that the Constitution provides that the Executive
Board Member from each of the Districts is an officer of
International and that Harry Mangus signed an affidavit as
Executive District Board Member and as an officer of the
defendant. (Note: Mangus' title was Executive District
Board Member.) (E-mphasis ours.) (The affidavit was one
of the grounds for Change of Venue of the original action
from Salt Lake County to Carbon County.)
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Article VII of the Constitution has been misconstrued
by plaintiff which refers to certain officers as constituting
the International Executive Board. We have heretofore
pointed out that Mr. Mangus was not an Executive Board
Member of International, but only a Board Member of District 22. The mere fact that Mr. Mangus signed an affidavit
for Change of Venue certainly does not establish a principalagent relationship herein. See Climax Dairy Company v.
Mulder, 242 P. 666, 78 Colo. 407. Furthermore, Mr. Mangus
signed said affidavit as a District Board Member, not as an
officer of the defendant, as plaintiff alleges (110). He did
not pretend to represent International. He testified on direct examination that in all of his conduct herein he was
not representing the defendant, and that he was an officer
of District 22 only. He signed the contract (Exh. ''B") as an
officer of said District only. He went to the mine on April
4, 1952, at the request of the officers of Wellington Local,
as above set forth. There is no evidence showing that defendant either knew that he went there, or that it authorized him to speak or act in its behalf, or that it clothed him
with any authority whatsoever to represent the defendant.
Agency may be ultimately established only by tracing its
source to some word or act of the alleged principal. Brutinel
v. Nygren, 154 P. 1042, 17 Ariz. 491; Litchfield v. Green
(Ariz.) 33 P. 2d 290; 3 C.J .S. 302, Sec. 328.
From the final paragraph contained on p. 7 of plaintiff's brief, plaintiff contents himself by saying that on the
general question of agency sufficient facts were put in evidence to show the agency relationship between International and the District officer (Harry Mangus) and certainly,
at least, to rebut all inferences, or presumptions that there

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
is no agency whatsoever. We do not find from the evidence
any showing that Harry Mangus was an agent of International acting within the scope of his employment. Furthermore, the evidence does not disclose that Harry Mangus had
any control whatsoever over the picket line. We submit that
the evidence shows no principal-agent relationship whatsoever, and that the wrongs complained of, if they were ·COmmitted at all, were committed by persons who are unidentified and who were not in any way authori·zed by International to commit them ; that International had no knowledge of said acts, and did not participate therein.
In plaintiff's desperation to find some evidence of agency, he refers to the incident where Mangus, Skinner, Rice,
and Olson went to the mine of the Eastern Utah Coal Company and stated to one of plaintiff's witnesses (Austin Beal)
that they were representatives of the United Mine Workers
of America (brief, pp. 3 & 8). Of course, since this broad
title is borne by members of the Local, District, as well as
International, this statement in and of itself cannot be construed as meaning International only. In the event such
statement was made, we would have to stretch our imagination to the breaking point in order to construe the same as
meaning to convey the impression that they were agents of
International. The logical and reasonable construction of
such statement would seem to be that they belonged to the
District or Local of said United Mine Workers.
Be that as it may, the authorities hold that the admissions, statements, and declarations of an agent other than
his testimony in the case where the issue arises, are not
admissible to prove agency (80 A.L.. R. 604) ; it has also been
held that there must be prima facie proof of agency before
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such statements or declarations are admissible for any purpose (Cronquist v. Smith, supra; State v. Kelly (N.M.) 202
P. 524). Therefore, the purported statement was not actually admissible, but was admitted subject to plaintiff's
promise that he would connect the same with the defendant
organization at a later time, which he entirely failed to do.
Both the operators of the Eastern Utah Coal Company
testified that they did not know the capacity in which Harry Mangus acted. It would be fair to state that both of them
merely assumed that he had authority to act for International. However, agency must be based upon evidence, not
presumption (Mecham on Agency, supra).
Mr. Mangus did not state to them that he represented the defendant. Certainly the defendant did not
at any time acknowledge Mr. Mangus to be an agent and
did not communicate any authority to him to act in this
case. Under the atbove circumstances, the holding in Dohrmann Supp,Jy Company v. Beau Brummel, Inc. (Utah) 103
P. 2d 650, applies, wherein this Court held that a person
dealing with a supposed agent is bound to ascertain his capacity. Also, that the acts or representations of a sales
representative cannot enlarge the scope of the representative's agency. Neither of the mine operators made any effort whatsoever to ascertain in what capacity Mr. Mangus
was acting. He has testified that he was acting for the
District only, and not for the defendant. It was Reichert's
duty to ascertain his capacity under the rule announced in
the Beau Brummel case.
There is a general rule of law that a union is not responsible for the unlawful act of individual members, which
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neither its officers nor committees directed or approved,
unless it was committed in carrying out their orders, or
unless it was an act contemplated as a probable incident of
an authorized strike. See 31 Am. Jur. 980, Sec. 296. There
is also a general rule of law that the fact of agency cannot
be established by proof of the acts of the professed agent
in the absence of evidence tending to show the principal's
knowledge of such acts or assent to them. (2 Am. Jur. 351,
352, Sec. 444.
We wish to call the Court's attention to Sec. 34-1-26,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads as follows:
"No officer or member of any association or organization, or no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute (as these terms
are herein defined) shall be held responsible or liable in any civil action at law or suit in equity, or in
any criminal prosecution for the unlawful acts of
individuals officers, members, or agents, except upon proof by the weight of evidence and without the
aid of any presumptions of law or fact, both of (a)
the doing of such acts by persons who are officers,
members, or agents of any such association or organization, and (b) actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or ratification of
such acts after actual knowledge thereof by such
association or organization."
From the above statute it appears that the plaintiff
must show that the persons who committed the alleged
wrongful acts were either officers, members, or agents of
the defendant, and that the defendant actually participated
in or actually authorized the same, or ratified the same after actual knowledge thereof by the defendant. We submit that the plaintiff has not produced any such proof.
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Point II
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW
ANY RATIFICATION

We cite what we deem to be the controlling Utah case
on this question, to-wit: Jones v. Mutual Creamery Company, 81 U. 273, 17 P. 2d 256, 85 A.L.R. 908. In the Jones
case, 2 C.J. 467 is quoted approvingly to the effect that
"ratification as it relates to the law of agency may be defined as the express or implied adoption and confirmation
by one person of an act or contract performed or entered
into in his behalf by another who at the time assumed to
act as his agent in doing the act or making the contract,
without authority to do so. The substance of a ratification
is confirmation after conduct; it confirms; it neither
changes the contract nor makes a new one with different
terms."
The Jones case further states: "It is also well recognized that, in order that a ratification of an unauthori·zed
act or transaction of an agent or of another may be valid
and binding, it is essential that the principal or the person
making the ratification had full knowledge at the time of
the ratification of all material facts and circumstances relative to the unauthorized act or transaction (2 C.J.
476), and also that an intention to ratify is essential
and which must be shown either by an express or by an
implied ratification (2 C. J. 484, 492)."
In the first place, the evidence in the case at bar does
not support a finding that Harry Mangus, or anyone else,
was acting as the agent of the defendant without authority,
or that he, or anyone else, pretended to act as such agent.
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We fail to find any evidence in the record that the alleged
principal had knowledge at any time of any or all the material facts with respect to the grievances mentioned, or
that the defendant intended to ratify any torts, or any
other acts. Without such evidence, there can be no ratification under the Jones case.
Plaintiff cites Kerr Gifford & Company v. American
Distilling Company, 95 P. 2d 694 (brief, p. 7). In the Gifford case, plaintiff claimed that defendant's special agent
had entered into a contract to purchase futures in corn,
and that defendant ratified the purported contract, relying
on a letter written with defendant's permission. It was
necessary to construe said letters. The court held that the
construction of those letters rested with the trial court.
Again, we have the question of the alleged principal
doing something, and the necessity of the Court's interpreting what the principal had authorized or sanctioned to be
done. This is not the situation in the Adamson case, where
the principal did nothing whatsoever as far as the evidence
is concerned. No act on the part of the alleged principal
needs to be construed, because the evidence does not show
that defendant did any act whatsoever.
As purported evidence of ratification, plaintiff cites
the threats of violence allegedly made, the picket line and
violent activi.ties set up, the defendant's warning against
violence, the signing of the contract by John L. Lewis, and
the dispersement of the pickets (brief, p. 7, 8). We have
discussed these matters above, and do not deem it necessary
to go into detailed discussion thereof at this point. We simply point out that the alleged threats of violence, the picket
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line, and the so-called violent activities have in no manner
been connected with the defendant, or with any agent of the
defendant in the course of employment. The warning given
against violence was, according to the evidence, a standard
instruction as far as International was concerned, and is given whenever any members are engaged on a picket line, whether International authorized the picketing or work stoppage, or otherwise. As to the contract being signed on
behalf of International by John L. Lewis, there is no showing made that at the time of the signing thereof he or International had any knowledge whatsoever of the alleged
torts. As to the dispersement of the pickets, the evidence
shows that members of Wellington Local were "delegated"
to get the men back to work and certainly this has not
been connected up with International.
In answer to plaintiff's contention that the mine owners had always dealt with and only had contact with the
District office in all dealings with the union (brief, p. 8)
there is no showing that these operators ever dealt with
the District on any occasion other than the one in question.
No course of dealing has been established, and as far as
the evidence is concerned, this is the only dealing they ever
had with the District office. The evidence discloses that in
this particular case, Mr. Mangus of the District Office was
accommodating the officers of Wellington Local. The evidence does not show that the owners made any effort to
ascertain the capacity in which Mr. Mangus acted, nor that
they were under the impression that they were dealing with
International. In fact, one of the owners stated that he
didn't know which was District and which was International. As to the four men who went up to the mine allegedly
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stating they were representatives of the United Mine Workers of America (not specifically that they were representatives of the defendant), we have discussed this subject
above and will not burden the Court with any further comment thereon. We refer the Court to our arguments heretofore made.
Plaintiff cites Hayward v. Yost, 242 P. 2d 971 (Ida.)
to the effect that where there are corroborative facts and
circumstances disclosed by the evidenc-e, agency then becomes a question of fact for the jury. The alleged corroborative facts relied upon in the Adamson case amount to
nothing more than an attempt on the part of the plaintiff
to impeach his own witnesses. When plaintiff called Mangus as a witness, and he testified he was not representing International, plaintiff tried to impeach his testimony.
Is this corroborative evidence?
As to the Arizona case, Maynard v. Hall, 143 P. 2d 884,
cited by plaintiff (brief, p. 8) we have no quarrel with the
general rule therein set forth. However, we do not find
sufficient evidence in our case from which any inference
of agency arises to require submission thereof to a jury.
The Oklahoma case cited by plaintiff (brief, p. 9) also sets
forth a general rule which we do not question. If there is
a conflict in the evidence on the question of agency, then
it becomes a question of fact. We do not find such conflict
in the evidence in the Adamson case. It appears that the
evidence is all to the effect that none of the wrongful acts
were authorized or participated in by the defendant.
We call the Court's attention to the requisites of ratification set forth in 2 Am. Jur., pp. 175-176, S.ec. 220,
wherein it is stated:
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''To be effective, the principal must intend to ratify
the unauthorized act, he must have the power of
ratifying the act done, he must ratify the transaction in its entirety, he must have knowledge of all
the material facts surrounding the transaction to
be ratified, the person acting in an unauthorized
manner must purport to be acting in the matter on
behalf of the principal, and the act itself must be
capable of ratification."
In VoL 2, Sec. 222, p. 177 of the same work, we find the
statement:
"There can be no ratification where it appears
that the person who performed the act or made the
contract was not at the time and did not profess
to be acting on behalf of the alleged principal."
We have already shown that the alleged principal had no
knowledge of the material facts, or an intention to ratify.
Plaintiff states (brief, p. 7) that defendant ratified
the alleged activities by receiving the benefit of the final
signed contract executed the day after the violence. However, in 2 Am. Jur., p. 181, Sec. 227, the author states:
"It is an established principle of law that where a

person acts for another who accepts or retains the
the benefits or proceeds of his effortswith knowledge of the material facts surrounding the transaction (emphasis ours), the latter must be deemed
to have ratified the methods employed, as he may
not, even though innocent, receive or retain the
benefits and at the same time disclaim responsibility for the measures by which they were acquired."
Again,
"The acceptance or retention of benefits derived
from an agent's unauthorized act does not amount
to a ratification of such act if the principal, in ac-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
cepting such proceeds or benefits does not have
knowledge of all the material facts surrounding the
transaction" (2 Am. Jur., p. 184, Sec. 229). (Emphasis ours.)
From the above principles, and the numerous authorities cited in support thereof, we submit to the court that
the evidence does not show any ratification on the part of
the defendant herein, and that the evidence was not legally
sufficient to submit to the jury.
In our argument thus far, we have assumed that the
acts complained of her·ein were subject to ratification on
the part of the defendant. These wrongful acts consist of
assault, battery, and false imprisonment on the part of
the pickets. Plaintiff so states on p. 1 of his brief. Assault, battery, and false imprisonment are crimes in the
State of Utah. (See Sees. 76-7-1, 76-21-1 and 76-7-3, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.) There is a serious question as to
whether or not such acts amounting to crime ·can be ratified. "Acts which cannot be legally delegated to an agent
to perform, such as acts to be done in violation of law, or
which would contravene public policy and which would
amount to crimes against the state, cannot be ratified.
The ratification which the law interdicts relates, however,
only to such acts as clearly appear to have been done in
violation of a criminal statute, the motive of the ratifying
party being presumably the concealment of the crime or the
suppression of its prosecution" (2 Am. Jur. p. 174, Sec. 218).
See also footnote 19 at 2 Am. Jur., p. 174.
While we firmly believe that the evidence does not
show a ratification for the reasons above mentioned, there
is a serious question as to whether or not the wrongful
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acts alleged by plaintiff are subject to ratification, in view
of the last citation, since the wrongful acts alleged are recognized by the laws of this State as being crimes against
the State.
WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully requests this
Honorable Court to affirm the decision of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
DART & SHEYA
By B. L. Dart and
Edward Sheya
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
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